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Abstract 
   In May 2010, we surveyed 473 Swiss homeowners about their preferences for energy 
efficiency renovations  in their homes.  We used conjoint choice experiments that asked 
respondents to choose among hypothetical energy efficiency renovation projects. We find 
that homeowners are responsive to the upfront costs of the renovation projects, the savings in 
energy expenses, the time horizon over which such savings would be realized, and the 
thermal comfort improvement afforded by such renovations. Even more important, the 
likelihood of undertaking energy-efficiency renovations increases with the size of the subsidy 
offered by the Swiss federal government. At least for an average-sized project, we find that 
the impact of a rebate is comparable to that of an improvement in the thermal comfort of the 
home. The savings in the annual energy bills and the duration of the investment are less 
important.  
   The discount rate implicit in the responses to the conjoint choice experiments is low.   
Depending on the specification of the random utility model, the discount rate ranges from 1.5 
to about 3%. This is consistent with the point in Hassett and Metcalf (1993) and Metcalf and 
Rosenthal (1995), and with the fact that our scenarios contain no uncertainty.  
    Respondents who feel completely uncertain about future energy prices are more likely to 
select the status quo (no renovations) in any given choice task and weight the cost of the 
investments more heavily than those respondents who expect energy prices to increase in the 
future. The hypothetical renovations are more likely to take place when respondents believe 
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Energy Efficiency Investments in the Home: 
Swiss Homeowners and Expectations about Future Energy Prices 
 
1. Introduction  
In most developed countries, buildings account for some 30-40% of total energy use, 
and improved energy efficiency in buildings is a potentially large (and untapped) source of 
CO2 emissions reductions available at low cost, at least from the social point of view (Levine 
et al. 2007; Choi Granade et al., 2009). In Switzerland, some 80% of the total energy used in 
buildings is for space heating. Technical assessments suggest that this could be reduced by 
33-50% in existing buildings and by 80% or more in new buildings by enhancing energy 
efficiency (Jakob and Madlener, 2004).  
Despite such an appealing potential, in Switzerland only 1 to 2% of the existing 
building envelopes undergo maintenance or renovation each year, and thermal insulation
1
Jakob (2007) concludes that several factors hinder energy efficiency renovations in 
homes in Switzerland. Such investments are usually undertaken at the end of the building 
element’s lifetime—which tends to be quite long in Switzerland—and during general 
renovation projects. Institutional disincentives and the diverging interests of landlords and 
tenants are also likely to play a role, since two-thirds of the Swiss rent their homes. Market 
forces only offer limited incentives, since energy efficiency is not yet adequately capitalized 
into housing values and rents.
 is 
implemented in only 30 to 50% of them (Jochem and Jakob, 2003). Such measures reduce the 
energy consumption of the building, and hence the energy bills, and improve thermal 
comfort. Why, then, are these measures undertaken so infrequently? 
2
                                                           
1 Thermal insulation is here defined as the insulation of the building envelope, including doors and windows, 
plus a ventilation system. The ventilation system provides the indoor space of the building with fresh and 
filtered air (pre-heated by a heat exchange system) without the typical energy loss of windows and traditional 
aeration systems.  
   
2 An economic analysis conducted by Zurich Cantonal Bank using hedonic pricing techniques suggests that 
energy-efficient windows raised the sale price of single-family homes by about 2-3.5%, while new single-family 
owners certified with the Minergie label sold for about 9% more than comparable homes without such 4 
 
Other market failures and barriers frequently cited as possible causes of this “energy 
efficiency gap” (Golove and Eto, 1996) include high discount rates, information gaps, 
transaction costs, the riskiness of  technologies, and access to credit, since substantial 
investments may be required to retrofit the existing housing stock (Clinch and Healy, 2000).  
Hassett and Metcalf (1993) and Metcalf and Rosenthal (1995) show that uncertainty about 
future energy prices and the irreversibility of investments play an important role in explaining 
sluggish energy efficiency investment rates.  
Numerous policy measures were introduced in Switzerland starting in 2000 to 
overcome these market barriers and failures. These include subsidies at the federal, cantonal 
and municipal levels, often framed as tax credits or deductions. Moreover, cantonal banks 
offer reduced interest rates on loans for energy efficiency investments in buildings. At the 
end of 2009, a new incentive program (“Gebäudeprogramm”) supported by the cantons and 
the Swiss federal government was established, providing CHF 133 million a year for energy 
efficiency investments.
3
In this paper, we are concerned with energy efficiency with respect to heating,
  This program is expected to continue until 2020.  
4
We ask four research questions. First, when homeowners make EE renovations and 
investment decisions, do they regard disbursements (the initial cost of the investment) and 
gains (government incentives and savings on the energy bills) as symmetric? Second, are 
government incentives effective in encouraging EE investments? Third, at what rate do 
 which 
depends mainly on the insulation characteristics of the building. We use stated preference 
methods to investigate the preferences of Swiss homeowners for home energy-efficiency 
(henceforth denoted as EE) renovations and their responsiveness to government policies. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
certification. However, this result was not statistically significant at the conventional levels (Borsani and Salvi, 
2003). 
3 At the time of this writing 1 CHF is equivalent to 1.03 USD. 
4 Cooling is not common in Swiss homes. 5 
 
homeowners discount future savings on the energy bills? Fourth, what is the role of 
expectations about future energy prices?  
We administered a survey based on conjoint choice experiments to homeowners in 
five cantons in Switzerland in May 2010. We focus on owners of single-family and semi-
detached homes, and row houses because they account for 60% of the Swiss housing stock 
(Swiss Federal Population Census, 2000). A majority of these buildings (over 85%) were 
built before 1990 (Banfi et al., 2010).  Attention in this paper is restricted to the homes that 
serve as the primary residence for the homeowner, because these persons incur both the costs 
and the benefits of retrofits. We further restrict attention to the owners of homes that haven’t 
been renovated since 1996, and are thus most likely to be renovated within the next few 
years. The alternatives in our conjoint choice experiments are hypothetical renovations 
defined by five attributes: i) upfront costs, ii) rebate offered by the government, iii) savings 
on the energy bills per year, iv) thermal comfort, and v) lifetime of the investment.   
Briefly, we find that, as predicted by economic theory, homeowners are responsive to 
the upfront costs of the renovation projects and do pay attention to the savings in energy 
expenses, the time horizon over which such savings would be realized, and the thermal 
comfort improvement afforded by such renovations. Even more important, the likelihood of 
undertaking energy-efficiency renovations increases with the size of the subsidy offered by 
the Swiss federal government. The effect of the subsidy, for a project of average size, is 
comparable to that of a thermal comfort improvement. The discount rate implicit in the 
responses to the choice questions is low (1.5-2.9%). 
Costs and savings tend to be treated asymmetrically, but the direction of this 
asymmetry is somewhat surprising: A subsidy of CHF 7,786 is sufficient to offset completely 
a CHF 10,000 increase in up-front costs. Importantly, persons who believe that climate 
change should be an important determinant of home energy efficiency renovations are less 6 
 
likely to pass up opportunities for renovations and weight the savings more heavily than the 
other respondents. The survey responses are consistent with the notion that uncertainty about 
future energy prices hinders energy efficiency investments (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; 
Metcalf and Rosenthal, 1995; D.L. Greene, 2011). Individuals who simply don’t know what 
the price of energy will be in 20 years are more likely to decline renovation projects and 
weight the upfront costs more heavily, whereas individuals who expect large price increases 
are more likely to undertake energy efficiency investments. These findings suggest that 
incentive policies should be accompanied by the provision of clear information about the 
savings in energy bills and greenhouse gas emissions delivered by EE retrofits in the home. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 presents the study design and the structure of the questionnaire. Section 4 presents 
the random utility approach and econometric model. We describe the characteristics of the 
respondents, their homes and responses in Section 5. Section 6 presents the estimation results. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background and Literature Review  
A. Hurdles to Energy Efficiency Investments 
Buildings account for some 30-40%  of total energy use, and engineering and policy 
circles alike hold that it should be possible to attain significant reductions in energy use (and 
in the emissions associated with power generation) if the energy efficiency of buildings was 
improved, especially residential buildings (Levine et al., 2007; Choi Granade et al., 2009). 
Much research has been concerned with the so-called “energy efficiency paradox,” whereby 
individuals pass up opportunities to purchase highly efficient, but somewhat more expensive, 
equipment (or energy efficiency investments) that result in energy savings in the future. 
Possible explanations for this behavior include (i) impatience (i.e., high discount rates for 7 
 
money), (ii) information failures, and (iii) uncertainty about the savings in energy 
expenditures (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Metcalf and Hassett, 1999). Attention has also been 
paid to (iv) institutional disincentives, which may occur when the party making the 
investment is not the one that reaps the benefits of that investment (e.g., landlords and 
renters; see Levinson and Niemann (2004) and Houser et al. (2009), and (v) liquidity 
constraints (see Golove and Eto, 1996, for a review).  
In this paper, we are especially concerned about (i), (iii) and (v). As mentioned, one  
possible explanation for the low rate of adoption of EE technologies holds that people have 
high rates of intertemporal preference (i.e., they discount the future heavily). An early review 
of the literature that empirically estimated the discount rates implicit in homeowners’ EE 
retrofit decisions or appliance purchases (Train, 1985) suggests discount rates in the 2-36% 
range for thermal integrity, space heating systems and fuel type, and even higher discount 
rates for specific appliances, such as refrigerators.  
Some observers believe that energy efficiency investments are undermined by the 
uncertainty surrounding the available technologies under real-life operating conditions.  
Metcalf and Hassett (1999) suggest that people do not believe the energy savings predicted 
by engineering estimates, and estimate a model that shows that people make investments in 
energy efficiency in homes at an internal rate of return comparable to market interest rates.  
Even in the absence of uncertainty about the energy savings measured in physical 
units (e.g., kWhs), monetized savings may remain uncertain because of fluctuations in energy 
prices. Hassett and Metcalf (1993) argue that the energy efficiency paradox is a rational 
response to uncertainty about the price of energy. They model the price of energy as a 
random walk—a stochastic representation that describes well actual energy prices—and show 
that, because EE investments are irreversible, it is rational for the consumer to wait one more 
period before making an investment to confirm information about energy price trends.  8 
 
Based on plausible assumptions about discount rates, their model predicts the 
investment rate to be low and EE investments to occur in a lumpy fashion, with extended 
periods of inactivity. Hassett and Metcalf also argue that the “high” discount rates estimated 
in the literature are an artifact due to the failure to account for an “option price,” and derive 
the relationship between true and “apparent” discount rates.  
We use stated preference methods and test this model empirically by examining 
whether—under well-specified conditions and in the absence of uncertainty in the choice 
scenarios—those individuals who state that they are completely uncertain about future energy 
prices and those individuals who expect price increases are, respectively, less and more likely 
to do EE renovations.  We infer the discount rate from the responses to choice investment 
questions, finding that it is much lower than the estimates obtained in earlier literature.  
We also investigate the effectiveness of (financial) incentives offered by the 
government in encouraging energy-efficiency investments in the home. Incentives that lower 
the up-front cost of EE retrofits and investments, such as rebates, tax credits and low-cost 
loans (Choi Granade et al., 2009) should increase the rate at which EE investments and may 
offer relief to liquidity-restricted homeowners. Indeed, government incentives to EE are 
currently offered to homeowners and renters in many countries, including the US, where they 
have been standard practice since the 1970s and were included in president Obama’s 2009 
stimulus package, and Switzerland. Little is known, however, about their effectiveness, and 
concerns have been raised that they may carry the risk of “free riding,” i.e., people take the 
subsidies but many of the observed investments would be made even in their absence.
5
                                                           
5 Grösche and Vance (2008) study four types of energy efficiency retrofits (attic insulation, façade insulation, 
window replacement, heating equipment replacement) as reported by 2530 single-family homeowner in the 
2005 German Residential Energy Consumption Survey.  They match each type of investment with engineering 
estimates of the cost of the investment and the energy savings (in KWh), and fit conditional and mixed logit 
models to obtain the marginal willingness to pay for each KWh saved. They define free riding to occur when the 
WTP for the investment is greater than its cost to the consumer, and calculate that it affects some 50% of the 
homeowners in their sample. They conclude that a recent policy in Germany that issues grants to homeowners 
for EE investments is highly cost-ineffective. Their conclusions, therefore, sound common themes with the 
  9 
 
 
B. Use of Conjoint Choice Experiments to Study EE Investments 
Conjoint choice experiments are a stated-preference method where survey 
respondents are asked to choose the most preferred out of K (K≥2) alternative variants of a 
good (or K policy packages), where each variant (or policy package) is defined by a vector of 
attributes. In each choice task, respondents are assumed to trade off the attributes of the 
alternatives being compared and select the alternative that gives them the highest utility.  
Conjoint choice experiments lend themselves to studying people’s response to 
technical, financial and policy aspects of residential EE renovation projects because their 
hypothetical nature allows analysts to observe what people would do under a much broader 
range of conditions than are experienced in real life.  
In the majority of the earlier studies based on conjoint choice experiments and 
involving residential projects, the alternatives being compared were either renovation projects 
or variants of one’s dwelling, and the attributes were physical interventions (e.g., new 
windows with double glazing, as in Banfi et al., 2008), energy efficiency outcomes (e.g., 
reduction in energy use by a specified percentage, as in Chau et al., 2010), and, in some 
cases, environmental quality improvements associated with the EE renovations (e.g., better 
indoor air quality and noise reduction, as in Chau et al., 2010). The monetary attribute (which 
is necessary to compute the marginal willingness to pay for an attribute) was, depending on 
the study, the cost of the project, the change in the monthly maintenance fee, or a housing 
price differential.     
To our knowledge, the earlier studies that have examined EE retrofits and investment 
decisions using conjoint choice experiments have found that people are willing to pay for 
such investments. For example, Banfi et al. (2008) estimate that respondents are willing to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
views in Metcalf and Hassett (1993), who recommend instead approaches based on regulations (e.g., prescribed 
energy efficiency standards for appliances and homes). 10 
 
pay 13% more than the current home price for new windows and 6-7% more for façade 
insulation. Jakob (2007) concludes that the marginal WTP for these improvements is greater 
than their market price, and hypothesizes that one reason why the actual rate of EE 
renovations and investments in homes is very low might be that energy efficiency is not yet 
capitalized into the prices of homes in Switzerland.  This has potentially important 
implications for government policies that seek to encourage energy-efficient homes. In Chau 
et al. the attributes (2010) are a dwelling’s water and energy efficiency, indoor air quality, 
noise reduction, landscaping, and the monthly fee. These authors find that energy efficiency 
is judged more important than water efficiency, and that residents of conventional and 





3. Study Design and Implementation 
A. Research Questions and Study Design 
  In this paper, we deploy conjoint choice experiments to investigate four research 
questions. First, when homeowners make EE renovations and investment decisions, do they 
regard disbursements (the initial cost of the investment) and gains (government incentives 
and savings on the energy bills) as symmetric? Second, are government incentives effective 
in encouraging EE investments? Third, at what rate do homeowners discount future savings 
on the energy bills? Fourth, what is the role of uncertainty about future energy prices?  
  Attention is restricted to home renovations that enhance the thermal integrity of a 
home. Such projects include insulation, replacing windows with energy-efficient ones, 
                                                           
6 The story might be somewhat different at other locales or when respondents must examine other types of 
technologies. Scarpa and Willis (2009) find that the WTP for so-called “micro-generation” technologies (e.g., 
solar and PV) in the UK is well below the actual cost of such equipment on the market, and conclude that 
subsidies and incentives will be important if non-fossil, renewable energy sources  are to become more 
widespread.   11 
 
replacing old and outdated furnaces and boilers, etc. The lifetime of such investments can be 
expected to be in the 20-40 years range.  
  We created choice experiments where the alternatives are renovation projects defined 
by five attributes: (i) the total up-front cost of the project, (ii) the rebate on the cost of the 
project (provided by the Swiss federal government), (iii) the savings on the energy bills per 
year, (iv) the lifetime of the investment, which is also number of years over which the savings 
would be experienced, and (v) thermal comfort. Three of our attributes are amounts of 
money, implying that—as we discuss in section 4 below—their coefficients in our discrete 
choice models are (rescaled) marginal utilities of income. This allows us to test whether 
individuals view disbursements and gains symmetrically, namely our first research question.  
We emphasize that our interest in asymmetric treatment of disbursements and savings should 
not be confused with the theory of prospects (Kahnemann and Tversky, 1979), because there 
is no uncertainty in our scenario, and because the cost of a renovation project is likely to 
capture other costs of the project, such as the disruption at someone’s home during project 
completion and the cost of acquiring the funds for doing the project itself, that are difficult to 
measure.  
  Since the rebate from the federal government is varied across renovation project, and 
ranges from zero (no rebate) to 30% of the cost of the renovation project, we are able to 
estimate its effect on the willingness to undertake home EE projects. By letting the horizon 
over which the savings are realized vary between 20 and 40, we can estimate the discount 
rate implicit in the individual’s response—or more precisely the discount rate that is applied 
for such relatively long investment lifetimes. 
  Our scenarios are cast in completely certain terms. Taken at face value, they allow us 
to investigate how homeowners would make decisions if they are completely informed about 
the economic aspects of the EE projects and there is no uncertainty about the costs and 12 
 
benefits of the projects. To make sure that people accept the “no uncertainty” of the energy 
savings associated with each alternative EE project, we assign respondents at random to one 
of two groups. Those in the first group are reminded that the annual savings in energy 
expenditures delivered by a particular project are computed as if the energy prices of today 
were to continue in the future. Those in the other group are not given this reminder.   
  It is important to us to investigate whether our EE projects have a different appeal to 
persons who believe that energy prices will increase in the future. For this purpose, at the end 
of the questionnaire we remind respondents that in the 12 months prior to the survey the price 
of heating oil was on average CHF 66.50 per 100 liters, and then ask them to tell us what they 
expect it to be in 20 years. Will it be lower? Increase by less than 10%? Increase by 10-50% 
percent? Increase by even higher percentages? We also offered a “don’t know” response 
option to capture complete uncertainty about future energy prices.  
 
B. Design of the Conjoint Choice Experiments 
In our choice experiments we asked respondents to consider hypothetical home 
renovation projects characterized by five attributes. Attribute and attribute levels are 
summarized in table 1.  
Briefly, attribute “Investment Costs” captures the upfront costs and is expressed in 
CHF. The initial investment cost amounts were selected from a range that varied with the size 
of the respondent’s home.
7
                                                           
7 For the purposes of our survey and this paper, a home is small if it is less than 130m
2, medium if it is between 
130 and 190m
2, and large if it is more than 190m
2. The average size of a single-family home in Switzerland is 
160 m
2.  
 Attribute “Subsidy” represents the subsidies provided by the 
government and is expressed in Swiss Francs (CHF).  Government-financed rebates on 
energy efficiency home renovations are well established in Switzerland, and so we expect 
most people to be familiar with them, even though they may have never received them 
before.  13 
 
Attribute “Comfort” captures the thermal comfort in the building after the renovation. 
Comfort can take two possible levels—remain the same or improve to attain an “an agreeable 
and seasonally balanced room temperature.” We present the savings on the energy bills by 
reminding the respondents about their current heating expenditure in CHF and stating the 
percent savings made possible by the renovation. Finally, attribute “Horizon” is the lifetime 
of the retrofit and hence number of years over which the proposed savings will be realized. In 
sum, in contrast to earlier studies, 1) three out of five attributes were amounts of money, and 
2) we did not specify the type of construction, device or technology corresponding to each 
hypothetical alternative.  
In the questionnaire, the conjoint choice questions were preceded by a screen that set 
up the choice experiments. We asked the respondent to imagine that he is about to start a 
renovation project, that he will be shown several potential such projects, and will be asked to 
tell us which one he would select. Only on that screen, for concreteness, did we provide 
examples of investments corresponding to specified investment amounts. For example, a 
respondent with a medium-sized home might expect new windows to cost CHF 20,000 and 
insulating the building envelope to cost CHF 100,000.  
The hypothetical projects were presented in pairs: Each respondent was shown a total 
of 6 pairs of hypothetical renovation alternatives. For each pair, the respondent was to 
indicate which he preferred between alternative A, alternative B, and neither one (the status 
quo). Clearly, the choice set for this question is 3.  The “neither” option is broadly consistent 
with the notion discussed in Hassett and Metcalf (1993) that individuals may want to wait 
before making an investment if future prices are uncertain. A sample choice card is shown in 
Figure 1.  
The design of the choice experiment is a Fold-over design. To generate this design, 
first an orthogonal design for alternative A was constructed resulting in 5×3
3×2=270 14 
 
combinations of the five attributes and their levels. Second, a fold-over design was used to 
generate a subsequent alternative B (Rose and Bliemer, 2009). We checked for choice tasks 
that contained a dominant alternative, i.e., one where all five attributes are better than in the 
other, or one where four attributes are better than and one is equal to the other alternative. If a 
pair of projects contained a dominant alternative, we reassigned one to another pair within 
this block until no choice task contained a dominated alternative. These 270 combinations 
were divided at random into 45 blocks each containing 6 choice tasks. 
 
C. Structure of the Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is comprised of 6 sections. The first (questions 1-6) is a series of 
questions about the respondent’s home and recent renovations, and serves as a screener. 
Specifically, the respondent is asked whether he owns or rents his home, the type of dwelling 
(single-family home or other), the year the home was built and when the respondent acquired 
it, and whether selected types of renovations were done in the last 15 years (since 1996).  
In this study, attention is restricted to owners of single-family homes, duplexes or row 
houses, and so the interview is terminated if the respondent is a renter or owns a home that is 
not of the above described types. The interview is also terminated if the respondent indicates 
that he or she has had the façade renovated since 1996, but continues if only the basement 
ceiling or the attic were insulated, or windows were replaced, in the last 15 years.  
In Section 2 of the questionnaire (questions 7-14), the respondent describes the size of 
the home (e.g., number of floors and square footage), its general condition and value. We also 
ask several questions about the heating system, the fuel used, typical annual heating 
expenditure, and the level of thermal comfort in the home.   
Section 3 (questions 15-20) is dedicated to renovations.  The respondent is asked to 
indicate the reasons why he hasn’t done the structural or energy efficiency renovations listed 15 
 
in the first section of the questionnaire. Was this because he felt there was no need for 
renovations, for financial reasons, to avoid the disruption associated with extensive 
renovations, because of an imminent move or because demolition and rebuilding are 
planned?  
We also ask the respondent if other renovation and maintenance work was done in the 
last 15 years, such as painting the interior of the home, renovating the bathroom(s) or kitchen, 
adding another room or converting unfinished space into finished space. Next, we ask the 
respondent which of selected energy efficiency investments (insulation of the attic, roof, 
façade or basement ceiling, new windows, or a new heating system) he is most likely to do in 
the next 5 years, and for what reasons. Is this to keep up or increase the value of the home, 
improve comfort or aesthetics, improve the energy efficiency of the home, for climate change 
considerations, to reduce noise or reduce the heating bills?  
Respondents who indicate that they were planning at least one such investment over 
the next 5 years are also asked to estimate the likely savings in the heating bills. Finally, we 
ask all respondents to tell us how important it is to them to have a home that is (i) in good 
condition, (ii) aesthetically pleasing, (iii) equipped with modern comforts, and (iv) energy 
efficient. 
Section 4 of the questionnaire contains the conjoint choice questions (see above). In 
section 5 of the questionnaire (questions 25-27), we inquire about energy conservation 
practices, the respondent’s opinions about energy efficiency policies (including incentives, 
low-cost loans, aggressive pricing, audits and regulation), and his familiarity with current 
Federal and Canton energy efficiency programs for homeowners in Switzerland.  Section 6 
(questions 28-35) contains the usual socio-demographic questions. 
 
D. Sampling Frame and Survey Administration  16 
 
The survey was administered on-line by Link, Inc. (a professional survey firm) in 
May 2010.  Our universe was comprised of owners of single-family homes, semi-detached 
homes and row houses that were built in 1990 or earlier, and had not received any major 
energy efficiency retrofits in the last 15 years. Attention was restricted to homeowners 
because renters do not usually undertake expensive renovation projects.
8
The survey was self-administered on-line by residents of five Swiss cantons (Aargau, 
Bern, Basel-Land, Thurgau and Zurich) that account for the majority of the German-speaking 
population. Data from the 2000 Census indicate that there are a total of 354,791 single-family 
homes in that region, and that the owner lives in 281,037 of them. Of these, 83% were built 
before 1990.  
 We ruled out 
owners of condominium apartments because they typically cannot make independent 
decisions involving the building envelope or the heating/cooling systems of the building.  
Link, Inc. has assembled a panel whose members are representative of the Swiss 
Population and use the internet at least once a week for private purposes. A total of 3499 
persons were selected from the Link panel and asked to participate in the survey. This group 
of potential respondents was supplemented with 305 persons recruited directly from ETH’s 
Centre for Energy Policy and Economics, for a total of 3804. Survey participants were 
assigned at random to two orthogonal treatments: 1) the version of the conjoint choice 
experiments (45 variants), and 2) the “reminder” about the calculation of energy savings at 
the current energy prices (present or absent).  
 
4. The Model 
We posit that the responses to the conjoint choice questions are driven by the random 
utility model: 
                                                           
8 Renters account for 60% of the homes in Switzerland, and conflicting incentives between landlords and tenants 
are one possible reason why many dwellings are energy-inefficient (Levison and Neimann, 2004).  17 
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) exp( 1    
where INVEST is the outlay (in CHF) for the hypothetical renovation project, REDUCT is 
the subsidy from the Swiss federal government (also expressed in CHF), S is the annual 
savings (in CHF) on energy and heating expenses made possible by the renovation project, T 
is the lifetime of the project, and C is a dummy denoting whether the retrofit improves the 
thermal comfort level of the home. In equation (1), coefficient β1-β3 are marginal utilities of 
income, β4 is the marginal utility of improved comfort, δ is the discount rate, and  SQ α  is a 
status-quo alternative-specific intercept. 
  Equation (1) assumes that individuals look at the net present value of the EE project. 
By design, the cost of the investment and the rebate (if any) is incurred immediately. The 
fourth term in equation (1) is the present value of the flow of savings in energy costs over the 
lifetime of the investment T. This is one of the two benefits of the renovation project, the 
other being the improvement in the thermal comfort of the home (the fifth term in equation 
(1)).   
  Assuming that error term ε is an i.i.d. draw from the type I extreme value distribution, 
the probability that the respondents selects alternative k in any given choice task is 










4 3 2 1 C
T
S REDUCT INVEST V SQ ⋅ +
⋅ − −
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + = β
δ
δ
β β β α   This is the 
contribution to the likelihood of a conditional logit model (Greene, 2011) that is non-linear in 
variables and coefficients.  
We expect  1 β  to be negative, and the other  s β  to be positive. The model is not 
estimable unless an additional restriction is imposed on the coefficients for identification. We 
experiment with three alternate restrictions. In our first round of estimation runs, we assume 18 
 
that credit is costless and individuals treat disbursements and financial gains symmetrically, 
so that  3 2 1 β β β − = − = .  If this restriction is imposed, all coefficients (including the discount 
rate, δ) are identified and equation (1) is simplified to  
(2)   ε β
δ
δ
β α + ⋅ +  

 
 ⋅ − −
⋅ − ⋅ + = C
T




  However, there is reason to presume that individuals do not treat the up-front cost of 
the project symmetrically with respect to its financial gains.  If credit is not free, then 
equation (1) must be amended to include the cost of a loan. Suppose for simplicity that the 
present value of the cost of a loan is proportional to the cost of the project, with the 
proportionality factor being α. Further suppose that individuals experience disutility when the 
renovation project is underway and that the disruption caused by construction is proportional 
to the size of the investment. Let the disutility of disruption be  INVEST ⋅ θ .  This would be 
sufficient to make  θ α β β + + − = 2 1  (with α and θ both negative) in equation (1) different 
from  2 β − . In our second round of estimation, we force  3 2 β β = and let  1 β  be different from 
them. In other words, all financial gains are treated alike but are potentially different from 
disbursements.
9
3 2 β β =  The restriction that   allows us to estimate the discount rate directly 
from the responses to the conjoint choice questions. 
Finally, if the discount rate δ is assumed to be zero, then the discounted flow of 
savings in equation (1) is simplified to the total undiscounted savings: 
(4)     ,
) exp( 1








which makes the model a standard, linear-in-the-parameters conditional logit where the 
regressors are INVEST, REDUCT and total undiscounted savings, S·T.
 
                                                           
9 We note here that while we allow potentially asymmetric treatment of disbursements and gains, our model is 
well within conventional utility theory and is not related to Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory. 19 
 
We test several hypotheses based on the models described above. First, we suspect 
that investments costs and benefits may be treated asymmetrically, and so we test (and expect 
to reject) the null hypothesis that  2 1 β β − = . Second, the three models can be amended to 
allow for the alternative-specific intercept, the marginal utility of savings and the marginal 
disutilities of disbursements to vary across respondents, depending on their 
sociodemographics and other variables, such as the respondents’ assessment of the 
importance of climate change consideration in motivating home retrofits.  
Third, following Hassett and Metcalf, we expect that the greater the uncertainty about 
future prices, the more likely is the respondent to choose the “neither project” alternative in 
any given choice task. To test this hypothesis we include in the model an interaction between 
the status quo and a measure of uncertainty, and test the null that the coefficient on that 
interaction is zero. If the Hassett and Metcalf model is borne out in our data, we expect to 
reject this null. 
 
5. The Data  
A. Characteristics of the Respondents 
In total, 3804 persons were invited to participate in the survey and 2129 persons 
began the questionnaire (2007 from the Link panel and 122 from the ETH group). A total of 
1383 were screened out because they did not meet our sampling requirements.
10
                                                           
10 We remind the reader that our requirements are that 1) the respondent owns his or her home, 2) this home is a 
single-family home, duplex, row house, or farmhouse built before 1990, and the respondent has lived there since 
2005 or earlier, 3) the respondent lives in one of five Swiss cantons (Aargau, Bern, Basel-Land, Thurgau and 
Zurich), and 4) no major renovations of the façade, or more than one renovation of the remaining elements of 
the building envelope (i.e. roof, basement ceiling or windows), have been done since 1996. Major reasons for 
eliminating observations were that i) the building was constructed after 1990 (N=586), ii) the façade of the 
house was insulated after 1996 (N=205) or iii) the respondent acquired the house after 2005 (N=99). 
 An 
additional 201 (169 from the Link panel and 62 from the ETH sample) exceeded the time 20 
 
limits for completing the questionnaire (N=201). Finally, 70 questionnaires were discarded 
because the canton quotas we specified for this study had already been met.
11
In total, 475 persons completed the survey (411 from the Link panel and 62 from the 
ETH sample). For the analysis, however, we excluded two underage respondents. The final 
dataset thus contains 473 valid observations. 
  
Tables 2 and 3 present summary statistics of the characteristics of the respondents. 
The average age is 56, the average respondent attended school for 14 years, and the average 
household size is 3.  
We elicited information about income using categories based on the quintiles of the 
distribution of gross household income in Switzerland. In total, 399 respondents report 
information on income. Median household income is about CHF 9100 per month. In our 
regressions, we summarize income information into a dummy that takes on a value of one if 
the respondent has income greater than 9,100 CHF (in other words, if he or she is above the 
median). 
The sample is well balanced in terms of gender, with slightly more men than women 
(55.8%).  The sample is also well balanced with respect to the cantons, with shares between 
18.4 and 21% each. A majority (63.2%) of the respondents lives in urban areas, where an 
urban area is a city or a metro area (not reported).  
 
B. Characteristics of the Homes  
We report descriptive statistics about the respondents’ homes in table 4. On average 
the living area of the house is 193 m
2 (median 180 m
2).  Most respondents (55%) live in a 
single-family home, 23% in a semi-detached home, 17% in a townhome or rowhouse, and 
5% own a farmhouse.  
                                                           
11 The survey firm was instructed to collect an even number of completed questionnaire in each canton. The 
final sample is comprised of 99 persons from Aargau, 87 from Bern Canton, 89 from Basel-Land, 99 from 
Thurgau and 99 from Zürich. 21 
 
On average, respondents report annual heating expenses of about CHF 2010 per year. 
In terms of heating, about two-thirds of the sample use fossil fuels to heat the home (oil 40%, 
gas 24%), and only 9% heat with electricity. About 58.1% of the sample reports using 




Wood and heat pumps are often used in combination with another heating system: Wood, for 
example, is commonly combined with heating oil (N=50).  Finally, 30% of the respondents 
state that they have changed the heating system since 1996 (not reported in the table). 
C. Representativeness   
In order to check the representativeness of the sample, we compared the sample with 
data from the 2000 Census
13
Comparison with the RBD is more difficult, because the RBD lumps together single-
family and semi-detached homes and does not distinguish between owners and renters. With 
these limitations in mind, the distribution of homes by vintage category in the RBD is similar 
to the Census (see table A1 in the Appendix), and our sample is comprised of generally 
newer homes than the stock of housing as documented in the RBD.  It is also possible to 
compare the size of the homes in our sample with the distribution in the population as per the 
 and the 2008 National Register of Buildings and Dwellings 
(RBD) for the five cantons in our study.  The Census reports the number of single-family 
dwellings used as a primary residence by their owners and built before 1990. Comparison 
with our sample (see table A1 in the Appendix) shows that our sample overrepresents newer 
homes and underrepresents older homes. For example, 46% of the buildings in the sample 
were built between 1981 and 1990 versus 20% in the Census. 
                                                           
12 Heat pumps are mostly geothermal heat pumps, but there might also be some air-to-air heat pumps in the 
sample. District heating is considered as renewable energy source since the heat is mostly generated as 
byproduct of industrial processes such as waste incineration. 
13 Data from the 2010 are not available yet. 22 
 
2000 Census, which we display in table A2 in the Appendix. Again, our sample 
overrepresents the larger homes.   
Because our survey was self-administered by the respondents on-line, we wondered 
whether our sample tended to be younger than the population at large. This is indeed the case. 
Based on comparison with Census data, young persons are overrepresented in our sample, 
whereas people aged 70 or older are clearly underrepresented (sample: 9%; population: 34%).  
 
D. Responses to the Choice Experiment Questions 
The frequencies of alternative A, alternative B and the status quo from the six choice 
tasks are displayed in Table 5.  Alternative A was selected in 37.5% of the cases, alternative 
B in 37.8%, and the status quo in 24.8%. 
We do not find any obvious patterns in the choices from choice task one to six.  There 
is no obvious pattern in the frequency of the status quo either, and based on these 
considerations we conclude that the respondents were not especially influenced by the order 
of the choice task. We find this result encouraging, in that it suggests that people were paying 
attention to the attributes of the alternatives, as we posit in section 4 of this paper and 
empirically test in section 6.  
We also checked our data for other possible anomalies. A closer look at the responses 
reveals that only 6 respondents (1.3% of the sample) chose alternative A in all six choice 
tasks, only 11 (2.3%) always chose alternative B, and 48 (10.1%) always chose the status 
quo.  We wish to emphasize that these may well be plausible responses; at any rate they occur 
in extremely few cases.  
 
E. Are the Attributes of the Alternatives and the Treatment Appropriate?  23 
 
Sample size limitations and the need to limit the cognitive burden imposed on the 
respondents suggested that we should restrict attention to one type of policy in the conjoint 
choice experiments, i.e. the subsidy offered by the government. Was this a good decision? 
We believe it was.  
Table 6 displays the responses to a question where we ask the respondents to indicate 
the three most important policies for making EE investments attractive. Clearly, “subsidies” 
and “deductions from taxes” (which is one way in which subsidies can be provided) are 
important to two-thirds or more of the respondents.  Reduced interest rates on loans are a 
distant second at 38%, and only about 21% of the respondents judge information important. It 
is interesting that regulations are selected as an important option only by 8.63% of the 
sample.  
  We also checked for whether the respondents’ familiarity with possible and existing 
policies. The responses to this question are shown in table 7. They show that 15% of the 
respondents have previously evaluated or considered programs that offer tax deductions (a 
form of subsidy) for EE renovations, and over 65% were at least familiar with them. Over 9% 
of the respondents had actually looked into two programs (“Gebäudeprogramm,” which 
started in 2009, and its predecessor, “Klimarappen”), and a total of 68% indicated that he had 
heard of them. By contrast, fewer than 6% had evaluated or considered a reduced interest on 
loans, and about a quarter of the respondents had at least heard of this option. Taken together, 
these statistics suggest that the subsidy was a good choice for the policy attribute in our 
conjoint choice experiments, and that respondents were comfortable and familiar with it. 
  Reasons for doing renovations (shown in table 8) include repair or keeping up the 
value of the home (67%), but also improve the comfort in the home (44%), reducing the 
energy bills (76%) and improving energy efficiency (53%), all of which are attributes of the 
hypothetical renovation projects. Importantly, climate change and environmental 24 
 
considerations were selected by 55% of the respondents, and reducing dependence on fossil 
fuels by 26% of them. This suggests that “private” motives are somewhat more important 
than “public” motives in driving the responses to the conjoint choice questions, but also that 
concern about climate change may well be a driver of EE decisions. 
  Table 9 displays the respondents’ estimates of future energy prices. Almost 12% of 
the respondents were completely unsure about the price of heating oil in 20 years. Out of 
those who were willing to make predictions, virtually all expect increases in the price of 
heating oil. Fully 40% indicates an increase between 10% and 50% over the current price. 
Nineteen percent of the sample is comprised of persons who expect large increases (13% 
chooses 100-200% increases, and 6% an increase by 200% or more).  
 
6. Results  
A. Basic Models 
  We present the estimation results for models without individual characteristics of the 
respondents in columns (A)-(C) of table 10.  All models were estimated with costs and 
financial gains expressed in thousand CHF.   
Column (A) displays the conditional logit that restricts δ to be zero. For simplicity, in 
this model we ignore the alternative-specific intercept. All coefficients are strongly 
statistically significant and have the expected signs. They suggest that the disutility of a 
dollar spent on investments is more than offset than the utility from a dollar’s worth of 
rebates, which is turn is slightly lower than a dollar saved on energy bills (regardless of when 
those savings are incurred).        
  In column (B), we display the estimation results for the model that does not restrict δ 
to be zero but does impose that all marginal utilities of money be the same. All coefficients 
have the expected signs. This model includes an alternative-specific intercept for the status 25 
 
quo, which is negative and quite large (in absolute value), implying that respondents are even 
less likely to choose the status quo than is predicted by setting all attributes to zero.  
 A striking result of the model in column (B) is that the discount rate is only 1.47%. 
This is in sharp contrast with much of the literature on the energy efficiency paradox, which 
ascribes this phenomenon to high discount rates, and with much empirical literature that has 
inferred discount rate by observing people’s investment decisions in durables. This finding is, 
however, broadly consistent with Hassett and Metcalf (1993), who show that the discount 
rates “apparent” in observed investment decisions overstate true discount rates. We removed 
any uncertainty from the scenarios we presented to the respondents, and that in itself may be 
the reason for the low discount rate (D. L. Greene, 2011). It is also possible that this result is 
due to the relatively abstract nature of our hypothetical projects (see Train, 1985), to the fact 
that our renovation projects do not entail assessment of EE technologies, and/or to our use of 
relatively long time horizons for the renovations.  
Thermal comfort is important to our respondents. The monetized value of thermal 
comfort is CHF 22,576. At the discount rate we infer from the survey responses (1.47%), and 
assuming an investment lifetime of 20 years, this is equivalent to CHF 1292 per year.  
Model (C) relaxes the restriction that all marginal utilities of money be the same. In 
this model, we simply impose that the marginal utilities of the gains (the rebate and the 
discounted savings on the energy bills) be the same. The estimated coefficients are close their 
counterparts in model (B), which is a restricted variant of (C). A likelihood ratio test, 
however, rejects soundly the null that the coefficient on the upfront cost of the project is 
equal to the negative of the coefficient on the rebates and the savings (likelihood ratio 
statistic 7.094, p value 0.0077). We therefore regard (C) as our preferred model.  
It is interesting that in (C) the discount rate (2.9%) is almost twice as large as that in 
(B).  Even this discount rate is, however, low. Even more important, there is evidence that 26 
 
costs and gains savings are treated asymmetrically, but—much like in model (A)—this 
asymmetry is the opposite of what we expected: It takes a rebate of only CHF 7,786 to offset 
completely an increase in investment costs of CHF 10,000!   
We re-estimated models (A)-(C) after including interactions between the attributes of 
the alternatives and a dummy for the “reminder” treatment, but we found that the coefficients 
on such interactions were jointly insignificant. We find this result comforting, because we 
had expected and wanted people to accept the project descriptions without trying to second-
guess where such savings would be coming from. 
One concern is that the conditional logit impose stringent substitution patterns that 
might be violated in the data. We attempted mixed logit (Train, 2003), but find no evidence 
that the coefficients are random. We believe this is due to the modest size of the sample, the 
small choice set used in our choice experiments (K=3), and few choice occasions per 
respondents (only 6; see van Haefen, 2011). When we run a variant on model (C) that 
accounts for the panel nature of the sample, there is evidence of within-respondent 
correlation. This key estimates from this run are  1 ˆ β =-0.0224 (t statistic -21.06),  3 2 ˆ ˆ β β =
=0.0293 (t stat 10.42),  4 ˆ β =0.498 and the discount rate is 0.0238 (t stat  3.43). The point 
estimates are thus very similar to those in table 8, column (C), and the predicted shares of 
projects predicted by this model are likewise similar. 
 
B. The Effect of Incentives and Other Attributes  
We use model (C) of table 10 to compare a renovation project that costs CHF 70,000, 
has a lifetime of 20 years and brings savings of CHF 600/yr for 20 years (but delivers no 
thermal comfort improvements) with a similar project that further offers a 30% rebate and 
with the status quo (no renovation project). The probability of selecting the first project is 
26%, that of selecting the same project with the government incentive is 39%, and the 27 
 
probability that the status quo (i.e., no project) is selected is 35%. If the rebate is removed 
and replaced with an improvement in the thermal comfort, the probabilities are 26%, 40% 
and 34%, respectively, suggesting that (at least for a project of this size) a large rebate and 
thermal comfort serve as substitutes for one another. 
If the annual savings are doubled, and the thermal comfort removed, from the second 
project, the probabilities become 28%, 34% and 37%, respectively, and if the lifetime of the 
investment in the second project is doubled (to 40 years, holding the annual savings at CHF 
600), they become 28%, 33%, and 38%. Clearly, it takes large increases in savings and the 
horizon over which such savings are realized for the effect on the probability of doing the 
project to be roughly comparable to that of the rebate and the improvement in thermal 
comfort.  
Model (C) further predicts that when larger renovations are considered, most people 
would pass up the project. For example, a CHF 150,000 project that delivers no thermal 
comfort benefits, produces 30% savings on annual energy expenditures of CHF 5000, and 
lasts for 20 years has a 12% probability, versus 30% if a 30% rebate is offered and 58% for 
the status quo. These probabilities become 10%, 40% and 50% the second project further 
offers thermal comfort. 
Our conditional logit doesn’t allow us to predict exactly the share of the population 
that would undertake a project with specific costs and benefits. It does, however, allow us to 
compute odds ratios between not undertaking any renovations at all and doing a project with 
the specific costs and benefits. For example, a homeowner would be 4.77 times more likely to 
pass up the CHF 150,000 project (with no rebate and no thermal comfort benefits) than to do 28 
 
it. If a thermal comfort improvement was present, the homeowner would be 3 times more 
likely to do nothing than to do the project.
14
    
  
C. Individual Characteristics and Climate Change 
  We experimented with interactions between the status quo specific intercept, upfront 
costs, rebates and savings and sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, but the 
coefficients on these interactions were generally insignificant. For the sake of brevity, in table 
10, column (D) we report the estimation results for a specification that includes interactions 
between sociodemographics and the present value of the savings. The coefficients on the 
interaction terms are statistically insignificant at the conventional levels when individually 
considered. Moreover, a likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null that the coefficients on all 
interactions are jointly equal to zero (likelihood ratio statistics 5.814, p value 0.21).  We 
observed similar results—in that the coefficients on the interactions were jointly 
insignificant—when we included interactions with the investment cost and with thermal 
comfort.  
  In column (E) of table 10 we drop the interactions with the individual characteristics 
of the respondents and include interactions between savings and dummies for the type of 
heating fuel used. Fuel type does not matter.  In column (F), we create an interaction between 
the discounted flow of savings on the energy bills and a dummy variable, CLIMCHANGE, 
indicating that the respondent believes that climate change considerations are an important 
reason for doing EE renovations. These persons attach a heavier weight on the savings on the 
energy bills than the rest of the sample: The coefficient on this interaction is large and 
statistically significant at the 1% level or better.  
                                                           
14 These calculations rely on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption implicit in conditional 
logit models.  29 
 
  To get a sense for the magnitude of this effect, consider the first example of section 
6.A, where a project that costs CHF 70,000, brings savings of CHF 600/yr for 20 years but no 
thermal comfort improvements was compared with a similar project that further offers a 30% 
rebate and with the status quo. For the average respondent, the probabilities were 26%, 39%, 
and 35%, respectively. For a person who believes climate change considerations are 
important, the probability of selecting the first project is 30%, that of the second project 48%, 
and the probability of declining either project is only 22%. Clearly, climate-change motivated 
individuals are much more likely to undertake a project and much less likely to select the 
status quo. 
This finding is consistent with the notion that individuals derive utility from reducing 
their household’s carbon emissions, which in turn slows down climate change, regardless of 
savings in heating expenses and improved thermal comfort. An alternate specification 
consistent with this interpretation is one that includes only one another interaction—between 
the climate change consideration dummy and the status quo. This model imposes the same 
restrictions on the coefficients as in (C). The status quo intercept is -0.475 (t stat. -6.06) and 
the coefficient on status quo × Climate change is -0.971 (t stat. -9.92), confirming that those 
respondents who feel that climate change considerations are an important determinant of 
home renovations are indeed less likely to decline the renovation project in any given choice 
task. 
 
D. The Effect of Expectations About Future Prices 
Based on Hassett and Metcalf (1993), we would expect that the greater the uncertainty 
about future energy prices, the more likely is an individual to choose the status quo in any 
given choice task.  By contrast, we would expect respondents to be less likely to opt for the 
status quo when they expect energy prices to increase in the future. (Energy prices are here 30 
 
measured as the price of heating oil, which is an important fuel for heating purposes in our 
sample as well as the rest of Switzerland.)  
We test this conjecture by running a model similar to specification (C) of table 11, but 
where we enter interactions between the status quo specific intercept and dummies denoting 
that the respondent expects a moderate price increase in the next 20 years (10-50%), a sizable 
increase (50% and higher) and is completely uncertain, respectively. The results from this run 
are displayed in table 11, panel (A). Clearly, the larger the expected price increase, the less 
likely is the respondent to select the status quo, but there is virtually no difference in the 
likelihood of selecting the status quo between those respondents who indicated a 10-50% 
increase and those who indicated a 50% or higher increase. Those respondents who are 
completely uncertain about future prices are not statistically distinguishable from those who 
expect a small decrease or a small increase in prices.     
We attempted to run models that include interactions between the price expectations 
dummies and all of the other attributes, but they were badly behaved and failed to converge. 
For this reason, in this paper we only report the results of a specification where the price 
expectation dummies are interacted only with investment costs (table 11, panel (B)). Briefly, 
the up-front cost of the investment is less unappealing to individuals who expect increases in 
the price of heating oil. This effect is statistically significant at the 1% level or better. 
Respondents who are completely uncertain about the future price of energy get more 
discouraged by the up-front costs than the baseline group (people who expect no change, 
modest decreases or modest increases in the price of heating oil), but this effect is not 
statistically significant at the conventional levels.  
We conclude that our data are broadly consistent with Hassett and Metcalf’s 
prediction that the greater the uncertainty about price, the more likely is an individual to wait 
before committing to an irreversible energy efficiency investment. They also provide support 31 
 
for the notion that the larger the expected price increases, the more appealing the energy-
savings retrofits.   
 
7. Conclusions  
  We have studied the preferences for energy-efficiency home renovations among 
Swiss homeowners using a survey-based approach and conjoint choice experiments. 
Attention was restricted to those homeowners who incur both the costs and the 
benefits of EE retrofits and who are most likely to undergo home renovations soon. Our final 
sample was comprised of 473 such individuals in five major German-speaking cantons in 
Switzerland. 
In our conjoint choice experiments, the alternatives are home renovation projects 
described by five attributes. Three of these five attributes are expressed in CHF, and any 
uncertainty about lifetime, costs and benefits, etc. is ruled out (see D. L. Greene, 2011).  The 
attributes are couched in a fashion that allows us to estimate the rate at which future savings 
are discounted. 
  The responses to the conjoint choice questions are well-behaved and consistent with 
utility optimization. Individuals prefer investment profiles that are less expensive, deliver 
larger savings, and entail improvements in thermal comfort. The discount rate implicit in the 
responses to the choice questions is very low (1.5-2.9%, depending on the specification), a 
result that is contrast with earlier literature and claims about the reasons for the so-called 
“energy efficiency gap” (Golove and Eto, 1996). Such a low discount rate may result from 
our no-uncertainty scenarios (D.L. Greene, 2011), from expressing most key attributes in 
monetary terms rather than technologies, from this study’s long time horizon (20-40 years), 
and from its abstract nature (Train, 1985).   32 
 
  Importantly, the rebate offered by the government has a strong effect on the likelihood 
of choosing a given renovation project, and, at least for a medium-sized renovation project, 
the magnitude of this effect is roughly comparable to that of improving thermal comfort in 
the home. Changing the savings or the lifetime of the investment—both such changes get 
folded into the discounted flow of savings over the project’s lifetime—is less important, even 
if our sample’s discount rate is extremely low.  We conclude that the types of incentives that 
people seem to respond best to are those that lower the upfront cost of the investment and/or 
increase other co-benefits of energy-efficiency investments, such as comfort in one’s home. 
  Failure to make energy-efficiency investments that, at least on paper, make economic 
sense has been attributed to a variety of reasons, including uncertainty about various aspects 
of energy-efficiency investments (Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Metcalf and Rosenthal, 1995; 
D. L. Greene, 2011). In this paper, we study the importance of uncertainty about future 
energy prices and empirically test the prediction in Hassett and Metcalf (1993) and Metcalf 
and Rosenthal (1995) that when prices are uncertain and investments irreversible, it may be 
optimal for individuals to wait before making the investment to confirm if prices are truly 
increasing or decreasing.  Indeed, we find that the respondents with the greatest uncertainty 
about future prices—those who said that they don’t know what the prices will be—are more 
likely to choose the status quo in any given choice experiment, and weight the upfront cost 
more heavily, than those respondents who expect meaningful increases in energy prices.  
  Even more important for policy purposes, individuals who believe that climate change 
considerations are an important driver of decisions to do energy efficiency renovations are 
potentially more willing to do projects, in part because they weigh the savings in the energy 
bills more heavily. Based on these results, we conclude that 1) incentives are a potentially 
promising policy avenue for increasing home energy efficiency, and 2) public campaigns that 33 
 
provide information about the costs and benefits of EE retrofits—including those to the 
public related to climate change—in the home may help boost EE investment rates.   
To further elaborate on the latter point, in the US, policies that rely on individuals 
modifying their behavior voluntarily in the interest of environmental quality—such as 
programs where public is asked to limit or forgo driving on high-ozone days (Cutter and 
Neidell, 2009, and Cummings and Walker, 2000)—have been found to be ineffective. 
However, Poortinga et al. (2003) report that households are more accepting of measures and 
changes to individual behaviors at home than in the transportation and mobility context, 
suggesting that more research—ideally, research that is based on carefully designed pilot 
programs with experimental treatments—is needed on the effectiveness of EE policies 
targeted at residential buildings and based on information and exhortations with a view to the 
public good.    
       
   34 
 
References 
ACEEE, 2009. 2009 ACEEE National Conference on Energy Efficiency as a Resource. Chicago. 
Banfi, S., M. Filippini, and C. Ramseier (2010), Erneuerung von Einfamilienhäusern. Eine 
mikroökonomische Analyse für ausgewählte Schweizer Kantone, Bundesamt für Energie 
(BFE), Bern. 
Banfi, S. , M. Farsi, M. Filippini, and M. Jakob (2008), “Willingness to pay for energy-saving 
measures in residential buildings,” Energy Economics, 30(2), 503–516. 
Borsani, C. and M. Salvi (2003), “Analysebericht zum Minergie-Standard,“ Memorandum of Zürcher 
Kantonalbank (ZKB) to CEPE-Team, Zurich, August. 
Bundesamt für Statistik (2010), Federal Population Census 2000, Anzahl bewohnte Einfamilienhäuser 
nach  Bewohnertyp und Bauperiode, Neuchâtel, Switzerland. 
Bundesamt für Statistik (2010), Federal Population Census 2000, Anzahl bewohnte Einfamilienhäuser 
nach Flächenklassen und Bauperiode, Neuchâtel, Switzerland. 
Bundesamt für Statistik (2008), National Register of Buildings and Dwellings (RBD), Neuchâtel, 
Switzerland. 
Chau, C. K., M. S. Tse, and K. Y. Chung (2010), “A choice experiment to estimate the effect of green 
experience on preferences and willingness-to-pay for green building attributes,” Building and 
Environment, 45(11), 2553 – 2561. 
Choi Granade, H. et al. (2009), Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, McKinsey Global 
Energy and Materials, available at 
http://www.mckinsey.com/en/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_Natural_Gas/Latest_thinki
ng/Unlocking_energy_efficiency_in_the_US_economy.aspx (last accessed 17 August 2011). 
Clinch, J. P. and J. D Healy (2000), “Domestic energy efficiency in Ireland: correcting market 
failure,” Energy policy, 28(1), 1 - 8. 
Cummings, R.G. and M.B. Walker (2000), “Measuring the effectiveness of voluntary emission 
reduction programmes,” Applied Econometrics, 32(13), 1719 - 1726. 
Cutter, W.B. and M. Neidell (2009), “Voluntary information programs and environmental regulation: 
Evidence from‘Spare the Air’,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 
58(3), 253 – 265. 
Golove, W. H. and J. H Eto (1996), Market barriers to energy efficiency: a critical reappraisal of the 
rationale for public policies to promote energy efficiency. LBL-38059. Berkeley, CA: 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. 
Greene, D. L. (2011), “Uncertainty, loss aversion, and markets for energy efficiency,” Energy 
Economics, 33(4), 608 – 616. 
Greene, W.H., 2011, Econometric analysis, Seventh edition, Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Grösche, P. and C. Vance (2008), Willingness-to-Pay for Energy Conservation and Free-Ridership on 
Subsidization. Evidence from Germany, Ruhr economic papers, Essen: RWI. 35 
 
Hassett, K. A. and G. E. Metcalf (1993), “Energy conservation investment,” Energy Policy, 21(6),  
710–716. 
Houser, T., S. Mohan, and R. Heilmayr (2009), “A green global recovery? Assessing US economic 
stimulus and the prospects for international coordination,” Policy Brief Number PB09-3. 
Peterson Institute for International Economics and World Resources Institute, Washington, 
DC, February. 
Jakob, M. (2007), “Essays in Economics of Energy Efficiency in Residential Buildings - An 
Empirical Analysis,” PhD diss., ETH Zurich. 
Jakob, M. and R. Madlener (2004), “Riding down the experience curve for energy-efficient building 
envelopes: the Swiss case for 1970–2020,” International Journal of Energy Technology and 
Policy, 2(1), 153–178. 
Jochem, E. and M. Jakob (2003), Kosten und Nutzen - Wärmeschutz bei Wohnbauten. Bundesamt für 
Energie (BFE), Bern. 
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk,” 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291. 
Levine, Mark, D. Ürge-Vorsatz, K. Blok, L. Geng, D. Harvey, S. Lang, G. Levermore, A. M. 
Mehlwana, S. Mirasgedis, A. Novikova, J. Rilling, and H. Yoshino (2007), “Residential and 
commercial buildings,” Pp. 53 - 58 in Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of 
Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change. Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Levinson, A. and S. Niemann (2004), “Energy use by apartment tenants when landlords pay for 
utilities.” Resource and Energy Economics, 26(1), 51–75. 
Metcalf, G. E. and K. A. Hassett (1999), “Measuring the energy savings from home improvement 
investments: evidence from monthly billing data,” Review of economics and statistics, 81(3), 
516–528. 
Metcalf, G. E. and D. Rosenthal (1995), “The’New’View of Investment Decisions and Public Policy 
Analysis: An Application to Green Lights and Cold Refrigerators,” Journal of Policy Analysis 
and Management, 14(4), 517–531. 
Poortinga, W., L. Steg, C. Vlek, and G. Wiersma (2003), “Household preferences for energy-saving 
measures: A conjoint analysis,” Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(1), 49–64. 
Rose, J. and M. Bliemer (2009), “Constructing Efficient Stated Choice Experimental Designs,” 
Transport Reviews, 29(5), 587-617. 
Scarpa, R. and K. Willis (2010), “Willingness-to-pay for renewable energy: Primary and discretionary 
choice of British households’ for micro-generation technologies,” Energy Economics, 21(1), 
129 - 136. 
Train, K. E. (2009), Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation, 2nd edition, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Train, K. E. (1985), “Discount Rates in Consumers’ Energy-Related Decisions: A Review of the 
Literature,” Energy, 10(12), 1243-1253. 36 
 
van Hafen, Roger (2011), "Estimation and Welfare Analysis from Mixed Logit Recreation Demand 
Models with Large Choice Sets," paper presented at AREC, University of Maryland, May 
2011, available at http://www.arec.umd.edu/Department/Seminars/2010-
2011/Roger_vonHaefen_5.4.2011.pdf.   




Table A1: construction period of the homes in the sample compared with the Swiss census 
2000 (only houses built until 1990) and the National Register of Buildings and Dwellings 
2008 (RBD) (only houses built until 1990). 
  Census 2000  Percentages  RBD  Percentages  Survey  Percentages 
Before 1919  29'692  12.71%  46‘894  15.73%  56  11.84% 
1919 - 1945  31'806  13.62%  44‘595  14.96%  39  8.25% 
1946 - 1960  37'872  16.22%  50‘786  17.04%  41  8.67% 
1961 - 1970  32'896  14.09%  40‘689  13.65%  32  6.77% 
1971 - 1980  49'792  21.32%  56‘688  19.02%  86  18.18% 
1981 - 1990  51'492  22.05%  58‘418  19.60%  219  46.30% 
Total  233'550    298‘070    473   
 
Table A2: living area in m2.  
    Census 2000 (N=211'624)  Survey (N=433) 
below 40    0.13%  0% 
40 - 59    1.23%  0.69% 
60 - 79    4.46%  1.39% 
80 - 99    12.71%  2.54% 
100 - 119    15.62%  4.62% 
120 - 139    19.31%  14.32% 
140 - 159    16.19%  15.01% 
160 - 179    9.47%  10.85% 
180 and more    20.89%  50.58% 




Figure 1: Example of a Choice Card. 
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Table 1: Attributes and attribute levels in the choice experiments.  
Attributes  Levels 
Investment costs [CHF] 






Subsidy [CHF]  0% 
15% 
30 % of the total investment costs 
Comfort  Same as now 
Improved 
Savings on the energy bill per year [%] 
(with respect to the respondent’s annual heating expenses) 
10% 
30% 
60 % of the annual heating expenses 
Time horizon for savings on the energy bill  20 years  
30 years  
40 years 
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Table 2: Characteristics of the respondents. 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Description 
respondentage  473  56.51586  10.01314  31  93  Respondent age 
Over65  473  0.218  0.49983  0  1  Homeowner is 65 years or older 
yearsschool  472  14.36864  2.713439  9  18  Years of schooling 
children  141  1.978723  1.098493  1  10  Number of children  18 and younger  
hhsize  473  2.868922  1.298527  1  11 




Table 3: Characteristics of the respondents. N=473. 
Variable  Obs.  Percentages     
Income I        Gross income classes 
according Switzerland’s 
quintiles of gross income 
(Bundesamt für Statistik 2009)  
Up to 4'600 CHF  20  4.23   
4’601 – 6'900 CHF  86  18.18   
6’901 – 9'100 CHF  122  25.79   
9’101 – 12'100 CHF  99  20.93   
more than 12'100 CHF  72  15.22   
Missing  74  15.64     
Income II         
IncomeH  171  36.15    Income larger than 9‘101 CHF 
IncomeNO  74  15.64   
No information about income 
available 
Male   264  55.81     
Employed  331  69.98   
At least one adult in the 
household is employed 
Retired  126  26.64    Respondent is retired 
         
         
Resident of         
Aargau  99  20.93     
Bern  87  18.39     
Basel-Land  89  18.82     
Thurgau  99  20.93     
Zürich  99  20.93     
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Table 4: Characteristics of the Homes. 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max.  Description 
Livingarea  433  192.7252  90.59595  50  900  Living area in m
2 
Single-family home  423  0.55    0  1  Single-family home dummy 
Semi-detached 
home  433  0.23    0  1  Semi-detached home dummy 
Row house  433  0.17    0  1  Row house 
Farm house  433  0.05    0  1   Farm house 
Heating costs  423  2009.456  997.4341  750  5500  Annual heating costs 
Heating oil  433  0.40    0  1  House is heated with heating oil 
Gas   433  0.24    0  1  House is heated with gas 
Wood  433  0.29    0  1  House is heated with wood 
Electricity   433  0.09    0  1  House is heated with electricity 
Heat pump  433  0.19    0  1  House is heated with a heat pump 
District heating  433  0.03    0  1  House is heated with district heating 
Solar   433  0.05    0  1  House is heated with solar energy  
Other heating  433  0.04    0  1  House has other type of heat 
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Table 5. Frequencies of choosing alternative A, alternative B and “neither one” (status quo).  
Choice task  Alternative A (%)  Alternative B (%)  Status quo (%) 
1  39.96  38.69  21.35 
2  39.11  35.31  25.58 
3  35.73  40.38  23.89 
4  36.15  39.53  24.31 
5  33.62  39.11  27.27 
6  39.53  34.25  26.22 
Overall   37.53  37.88  24.77 
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Table 6. What are the three most important items that make energy efficiency investment 
attractive? 
Description   Percent of the Sample 
Discount on interest rates on mortgages  38.11 
Better availability of technical information  21.26 
Deducting the cost of renovations from taxes for several 
years  65.26 
More subsidies  62.32 
Higher energy prices  17.26 
Laws and regulations   8.63 
Simplify/relax requirements on buildings  30.11 
No VAT on EE investments  26.53 
 
 
Table 7. Familiarity with Policies. 
Description  Respondent 
considered 
such an option 
before 
Respondent is 
aware of such a 
policy  
Respondent is not aware 
of such a policy  
Reduced interest rates on loans (offered 
by certain banks)  5.68  25.68  68.63 
promotion through the 
canton/community  14.74  56.84  28.42 
tax deductions  15.37  65.68  18.95 
subsidy through 'Klimarappen'  4.84  50.74  44.42 
subsidy through 'Das Gebäudeprogramm'  4.63  17.89  77.47 
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Table 8. Reasons for Doing Renovations. 
Description   Percent of the Sample 
repair/keep up the value  66.58 
increase the value  10.70 
increase comfort in the home  44.12 
Aesthetics  3.48 
climate and environment considerations (ClimChange)  54.55 
noise protection  7.22 
savings on the energy bills  76.20 
improve energy efficiency  53.48 
reduce dependence on fossil fuels  25.67 
Other  1.34 
 
 
Table 9. Future prices of oil. 
Description   Percent of the Sample 
Decrease  0.42 
increase by 0-10%  3.37 
increase by 10-50%   40.21 
increase by 50-100%   25.26 
increase by 100-200%   12.63 
increase by over 200%  6.32 
don’t know/no idea   11.79 
 Table 10. Estimation Results. Basic Models. N=2838. 
 
Regressor  (A)*  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
Status quo intercept 
 
-0.892 (-13.27)  -0.832 (-11.61)  -0.821 (-11.41)  -0.805 (-11.1)  -0.819 (-11.4) 
Investment costs  -0.0147 (-17.4)  -0.0198 (-21.81)  -0.0204 (-21.4)  -0.0203 (-21.21)  -0.0198 (-20.26)  -0.0201 (-20.85) 
Reduction on investment costs  0.0191 (6.29)  0.0198 (21.81)  0.0262 (9.9)  0.0258 (9.55)  0.023 (7.67)  0.0228 (8.13) 
Savings 
 
0.0198 (21.81)  0.0262 (9.9)  0.0258 (9.55)  0.023 (7.67)  0.0228 (8.13) 
Savings × gender 
   
  0.0087 (1.57)     
Savings × college 
   
  -0.00062 (-0.12)     
Savings × incH (income higher than the average) 
   
  0.0042 (0.79)     
Savings × incNO (no information on income) 
   
  -0.0032 (-0.56)     
Savings × renewables           0.0147 (1.3)   
Savings × heating with oil 
   
    0.0343 (2.01)   
Savings × heating with gas 
   
    0.0324 (1.85)   
Savings × ClimChange 
   
      0.074 (4.27) 
Comfort  0.6635 (13.9)  0.447 (8.85)  0.45 (8.9)  0.448 (8.85)  0.445 (8.78)  0.460 (8.99) 
Horizon × Savings  0.0244 (17.36) 
 
       
Discount Rate 
 
0.0147 (2.69)  0.029 (3.77)  0.0399 (3.23)  0.085 (2.74)  0.0851 (4.42) 
Log L  -2772.636  -2704.651  -2701.104  -2698.197  -2634.457  -2649.705 
* Specification (A) imposes the restriction that δ=0. 
Note: ClimChange = Reason for motivations might be climate and environmental considerations. 
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Table 11. The Effect of expectations about future energy prices. N=2838. 
  (A) Effect on the 
choice of the status 
quo 
(B) Effect on the 
unattractiveness of 
investment costs 
Regressor   coefficient  t stat  coefficient  t stat 
Status quo intercept   -0.216  -1.03  -0.847  -11.76 
Status quo × heating oil prices will increase by 10-50%   -0.776  -3.62     
Status quo × heating oil prices will increase by 50% or more  -0.736  -3.46     
Status quo × complete uncertainty about future heating oil prices   0.078  0.34     
Investment costs  -0.0204  -21.37  -0.0253  -9.12 
Investment costs × heating oil prices will increase by 10-50%      0.00636  2.29 
Investment costs × heating oil prices will increase by 50% or more      0.00575  2.08 
Investment costs × complete uncertainty about future heating oil 
prices 
    -0.00346  -1.09 
Subsidy   0.0265  9.98  0.0263  9.92 
Savings   0.0265  9.98  0.0263  9.92 
Comfort  0.449  8.87  0.449  8.88 
Discount rate   0.0284  3.76  0.0284  3.73 
Log L  -2675.74  -2685.255 
 
 
 